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similar papers in the recent literature, most notably
Ball and Sheridan (forthcoming). LNP investigate
the experience of inflation targeters and non-tar-
geters since 1994 in a number of Organisation for
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)
countries. They also evaluate the experience with
inflation targeting in a number of emerging market
economies.
In contrast to Ball and Sheridan as well as several
other previous papers, LNP find a number of clear
differences between inflation targeters and non-
targeters. They investigate inflation forecasts at a
number of horizons and find that the changes in
inflation forecasts are correlated with lagged averages
of inflation for non-targeters but uncorrelated for
inflation targeters. They find that inflation is more
persistent for non-targeters. While the difference is
rather small for inflation measured by the consumer
price index (CPI), it becomes substantial once the
attention is focused on core inflation, i.e., leaving
out prices for food and energy, thus refining the
results by Ball and Sheridan (forthcoming), who
focused only on CPI inflation. LNP document that
gross domestic product (GDP) growth volatility is the
same for targeters and non-targeters, but inflation
volatility is higher for inflation targeters, but argue
that this is due to experiencing larger shocks rather
than the monetary policy strategy itself. As for
emerging market economies, they document that
the introduction of the inflation target moves infla-
tion expectations down gradually: The transition is
a smooth one and not characterized by a break at
the introduction of IT.
This is all fascinating. It is well-crafted research,
providing us with a wealth of additional insights and
differences between countries that have adopted
inflation targeting and those that have not. The
choice of empirical relations these authors look at—
for example, the variety of links between inflation
forecasts and inflation or the persistence of core
inflation—is well chosen in that these are some of
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nflation targeting has become the new gospel
for conducting monetary policy. Its merits have
been stressed repeatedly by a large literature,
most recently by Michael Woodford (2004). The
appeal is obvious. Monetary economists have con-
cluded that, by and large, monetary policy cannot
do much more than achieve some desired level of
inflation. Even to the extent that monetary policy
can have an influence on real activity, this lever
should be used only with great caution, as it may
endanger the reputation to effectively fight infla-
tion over the longer-term horizon, if used oppor-
tunistically. The argument of Kydland and Prescott
(1977)—that monetary policy pursuing short-term
goals in a discretionary, opportunistic manner is
worse than a policy committed to and sticking to
an a priori well-chosen course of action—is funda-
mental and well understood. Inflation targeting is
often advertised as a way for monetary policy to
achieve an additional degree of this desirable com-
mitment. Inflation targeting is furthermore sold as
an effective communications policy, as it makes
the public focus on inflation as the macroeconomic
variable (among those the public cares about) that
is most effectively influenceable by monetary policy.
In sum, inflation targeting is an appealing idea on
a priori theoretical grounds.
But inflation targeting has long moved beyond
the realm of academic conferences and scholarly
journals. It actually may have had its origins in the
practical choices undertaken by some central banks,
and it is now in use by a large variety of central
banks around the world. Thus, the interesting ques-
tion is whether inflation targeting is also appealing
because of the experiences gained in practice. This
is, in essence, the question asked by Andrew Levin,
Fabio Natalucci, and Jeremy Piger (hereafter, LNP)
in their paper. Their paper follows several other,
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the key dimensions where one would believe a priori
that inflation targeting may make a difference. The
choices are creative in that some of these dimensions
have not received sufficient attention before. The
documentation on the details of inflation targeting
in a number of emerging market economies will be
useful input into further research into these issues.
ASSESSMENT
I shall by and large not quarrel with the empirical
findings. The correlations found by the authors seem
to be there, and they can be read as a list of interest-
ing differences between countries that have formally
adopted inflation targeting and those that have not.
There is an issue regarding the bias in their estimate
of the regression coefficient of inflation forecasts
on current inflation: However, this issue is not the
key concern I have about this paper, and I shall
discuss it last.
Rather, I shall quarrel with the interpretation of
these findings. The title of the paper already suggests
that the authors are not merely interested in uncover-
ing correlations, but in documenting causation,
interpreting these numbers as macroeconomic
effects of inflation targeting. In short, they wish to
have a reader read these findings as an answer to
the policy question of interest: Does inflation target-
ing matter? And even if the authors abstained from
any interpretation in that direction, this would be
the question foremost on the mind of any reader of
their paper.
I am skeptical that such a causal interpretation
is legitimate. In particular, I am wondering about
four issues. First, which central bank should be
classified as inflation targeting? That is, is this classi-
fication useful? Second, has inflation targeting been
beneficial for the variables of ultimate interest, i.e.,
for reducing the level and volatility of inflation, for
reducing the volatility of output growth, and perhaps
for increasing the level of economic activity? Third,
the adoption of inflation targeting seems to me to
be largely a choice endogenously explained by some
of the variables under investigation: This is true in
the OECD sample, but it is particularly true for the
emerging market economies. For example, fiscal
restraint there probably matters far more than the
adoption of a formal inflation target. Finally, given
all the supposed benefits of inflation targeting, one
has to wonder what central banks did before infla-
tion targeting and whether inflation targeting will
help prevent bad monetary policy in the future. 
WHICH CENTRAL BANKS PURSUE
INFLATION TARGETING?
In his comments on the Ball-Sheridan paper,
Mark Gertler (forthcoming) pointed out that classify-
ing countries in the run-up to the European mone-
tary union as non-inflation targeters seems a bit
arbitrary in light of the fact that there were some
rather explicit preconditions in terms of achieved
inflation rates for entering the monetary union.
This applies to the LNP paper as well. More gener-
ally, where is the big difference between a central
bank that pursues the goal of price stability as a
prerequisite to monetary union and a central bank
that issues official statements about its price stability
goals? Do we really think that printing fan charts of
inflation in monthly reports can make a substantial
difference in monetary policy?
Take the case of the Bundesbank, a non-inflation
targeter according to the classification in LNP. Indeed,
officially, the Bundesbank has pursued money
growth rate targeting for many years. But, as has been
noted by a number of authors, the Bundesbank has
always chosen to ignore violations of the announced
money growth rate target, if it helped in pursuing
some other, more important goal—most notably
price stability. Secondly, the money growth rate target
has been derived from some underlying goal regard-
ing the desired inflation rate, even if that may not
have been stated as explicitly as, say, by the Bank
of England. Finally, public debates about monetary
policy choices by the Bundesbank rarely evolved
around keeping or violating money growth rate tar-
gets: Rather, the debates were practically always in
terms of inflation.
The literature has drawn a distinction between
central banks that attach a high weight to inflation
versus central banks that pursue inflation targeting
(which is also consistent with a low weight on infla-
tion in the objective function of the central bank);
it has also emphasized that the distinction between
targeters and non-targeters is a distinction regarding
their communication strategies. But if the commu-
nication, however done, ends up leading to a public
discussion and evaluation of monetary policy
choices regarding achieved levels of inflation and
implications for inflation rates in the future (as was
undoubtedly the case for the Bundesbank) and if
by contrast public debates focus on exchange rate
movements and the general state of the economy
rather than on keeping or violating some inflation
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target (even if the appropriate fan charts are printed
in some monthly bulletin), isn’t it a bit artificial to
call such a bank an inflation targeter and the
Bundesbank a non-targeter? One could argue that
successful inflation targeting should precisely lead
to the end of the discussion about likely inflation
rates in the future and that the debate should there-
fore shift to other issues. But this misses the point.
Inflation targeting presumably works only if the
central bank is somehow held accountable for violat-
ing its inflation goals: If a reaction in the public
debate is unlikely even when violations occur, and
if the central bank that is officially targeting inflation
does not care either, then inflation targeting takes
place on paper only. Indeed, this is precisely the
argument that has been made regarding money
growth rate targeting for the Bundesbank: It applies
with similar force to inflation targeting.
Moreover, proponents of inflation targeting
typically argue for “flexible inflation targeting,”
which seems to mean that central banks also weigh
in objectives other than pursuing their inflation tar-
get when making their policy choices. For example,
a central bank targeting a particular rate of inflation
may decide to pursue a looser monetary policy in a
recession and a tighter monetary policy in a boom,
even if this leads to medium-term violations of
their inflation target, as long as this is all explained
well to the public. Interestingly, money growth rate
targeting can be viewed as accomplishing precisely
this. If a central bank pursues a particular rate of
money growth, calculated as the sum of desired
inflation and average economic growth and subtract-
ing average changes in the velocity of money, then
money growth will be high; thus, monetary policy
will be loose precisely when economic growth falls
short of the average, and the other way around.
Money growth rate targeting has gone out of fashion,
but it almost certainly is a better way to implement
“flexible inflation targeting” than a policy that rigidly
enforces a particular inflation rate period by period!
So, perhaps, the Bundesbank should be classified
as a flexible inflation targeter, while other central
banks that rigidly focus on inflation in their reports
should be excluded from this category. Since the
issue at stake is whether flexible inflation targeting
should be used or not, the categorization by LNP
(using categorizations put forth by a number of pre-
vious authors, obviously, so they are not to blame)
could be entirely misleading.
HAS INFLATION TARGETING BEEN
BENEFICIAL?
Despite the arguments given above, I shall pro-
ceed with the categorization and the results in LNP
as the working hypothesis regarding the differences
between inflation targeters and non-targeters. The
key policy question in light of this experience is: Has
inflation targeting been beneficial? More precisely,
has inflation targeting been beneficial for the vari-
ables of ultimate interest, i.e., for reducing the level
and volatility of inflation, for reducing the volatility
of output growth, and perhaps for increasing the
level of economic activity? It may be nice (if true)
that long-run inflation expectations are anchored
more firmly for inflation-targeting countries, but
how helpful has that been for the variables we ulti-
mately care about?
Here, the inflation targeters do not seem to fare
well. Table 4 in LNP reveals that the standard devia-
tion of inflation for inflation targeters has been 1.54,
but only 0.81 for non-targeters, while output growth
volatility has been essentially the same (2.63 versus
2.48). Based on these numbers alone, one certainly
would not want to make the case that adopting
inflation targeting is a good idea. 
The authors stress that this unconditional per-
spective is misleading because inflation-targeting
countries may have been hit by larger shocks or
have started from economic conditions that were
worse. Indeed, this argument is at the heart of the
Ball-Sheridan (forthcoming) paper: If one takes
initial conditions into account, most of the differ-
ences between inflation targeters and non-targeters
are explained by “regression to the mean.”
Would the authors here reach the same conclu-
sion? That would then say only that there really is
no substantive difference in economic activity due
to the introduction of inflation targeting; and this
again does not provide an argument in favor of intro-
ducing IT (nor, obviously, an argument against it). It
seems to me that much more work than is in this
paper is required before it is possible to conclude
that inflation targeters have been more successful
in containing shocks hitting the economy than non-
targeters have been. One could do this, it seems to
me, by more finely identifying the shocks hitting
these economies with, say, a multivariate VAR, and
to then assess their impact on monetary policy
choices as well as inflation expectations.
Examining Figure 1 in the LNP paper reveals
that inflation expectations gradually kept declining
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for the non-targeters, but not so for the inflation-
targeting countries. While one could debate whether
inflation expectations have declined too much in
Japan, overall this figure does indicate to me that
the non-targeters have been more successful in
bringing inflation down to the (currently) most
desired level, somewhere between 1 percent and 3
percent. Inflation targeting does not strike me as
virtuous monetary policy if the target is too high!
The analysis also reveals that the inflation forecasts
had similar volatility across both groups of countries:
While there may have been more external shocks
in the targeting countries, I am nonetheless surprised
that the targeters apparently were not able to offset
these shocks sufficiently to anchor long-term expec-
tations more firmly.
Finally, the authors document that inflation
volatility has been of a more transitory rather than
persistent nature for targeters than for non-targeters.
In particular, the response of core CPI is more tran-
sitory in targeting countries. So, perhaps one could
make the case that inflation targeting leads to a
shift of inflation volatility from the low-frequency
spectrum to higher frequencies. But would that be
desirable? Probably not. Recent models of the New
Keynesian variety allow for some indexation of
otherwise sticky prices to past or to expected infla-
tion: In these models, ongoing inflation or predict-
able inflation (or deflation, for that matter!) is not
particularly harmful. Instead, the economic distor-
tions mainly come from distorting relative prices
between firms that can adjust their prices in response
to current shocks and firms that cannot. In short, in
these models, low-frequency volatility of inflation
is ok, but high-frequency volatility is bad for the
economy and leads to an overall lower level of
economic activity. If this is what would happen with
inflation targeting, which seems to be what the
empirical results suggest, then this would be an
argument against inflation targeting, not for it.
ENDOGENEITY
An overarching problem in moving from inter-
preting the correlations as indicating causation is
the endogeneity of the introduction of inflation
targeting. While this could help the case in favor of
inflation targeting (for example, if countries with
highly volatile inflation adopt inflation targeting,
one cannot blame that high volatility on inflation
targeting), one should not move to a causal inter-
pretation, given the evidence currently presented.
Put differently, inflation targeting is probably often
introduced in the aftermath of some mild or strong
crisis or some general overhaul of institutional
structures.
The endogeneity issue is already important for
the OECD countries under consideration. For exam-
ple, inflation targeting was introduced in the United
Kingdom alongside a whole set of institutional
changes, most notably a greater degree of independ-
ence for the Bank of England. Indeed, one can read
the Ball-Sheridan (forthcoming) paper as arguing
that inflation targeting was typically introduced
when the economic situation was sufficiently bad.
By contrast, things “look OK” in the United States
and the European Monetary Union. The need to
introduce inflation targeting there simply has not
been as pressing, so it has not been done.
The endogeneity issue is of even stronger force
for the emerging market economies investigated
by LNP. A number of recent papers in the literature
have documented that fiscal consolidation and
reform have been of greatest importance in allowing
monetary policy to pursue the goal of price stability.
As an example, the currency board in Argentina did
not break down because the central bank lacked
commitment, but rather because the fiscal situation
deteriorated. Likewise, the dramatically high inflation
rates in Russia at the beginning of the 90s were not
a choice by central bankers uninterested in the
pursuit of price stability, but rather were because
the only way to finance government expenditures
in the absence of a functioning tax system (aside
from borrowing) was seignorage.
These fiscal considerations are key in evaluating
the success or failure of monetary policy reforms in
emerging market economies. They are largely absent
in the paper at hand and should be investigated
seriously in future research following up on LNP. 
The interesting question remains whether infla-
tion targeting has contributed above and beyond
fiscal consolidation or general institutional reforms.
To answer this question, one would need to find a
clever instrument for the introduction of inflation
targeting, one uncorrelated with these other forces.
Finding a convincing instrumental variable seems
to be a thorny problem here, but one worthy of
attention. For example, one might try the fraction
of academics on the boards of central banks (who
may presumably be more inclined to move toward
the academically appealing idea of inflation target-
ing); but even this might just be a consequence of
general reforms. An alternative is to control more
 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS Uhlig
JULY/AUGUST 2004      85
carefully for variables indicating reforms, e.g., the
ratio of fiscal deficits to GDP and the like.
The authors are careful in not overstating their
results, and that is good. For example, they say that
“it is not completely obvious, however, the extent to
which [the reduction in inflation] can be credited...
to IT.” They observe that the reduction in inflation
expectations is gradual and that no sharp break can
be observed at the time of its introduction. This all
seems to me to be in line with the view that the
introduction of inflation targeting at some point is
simply a step that typically happens in countries
undergoing reform.
WHAT DID CENTRAL BANKS DO BEFORE
THERE WAS INFLATION TARGETING?
The paper investigates the episode since 1994
to evaluate the macroeconomic effects of inflation
targeting. That may be a rather short period to evalu-
ate the success or failure of certain monetary policy
principles. Of course, inflation targeting did not exist
before that time (to my knowledge). So, for example,
what did the Fed do as a non-targeter (but perhaps
recently influenced by the targeting debates) before
inflation targeting was a policy option? Was mone-
tary policy necessarily much worse?
Figure 1 shows inflation in the United States,
using annual data on the personal consumption
expenditures, taken from the national income and
product accounts (NIPA) tables published by the
Bureau of Economic Analysis. There were several
episodes of low inflation, like the 1930s, the 1950s
and 1960s, and the episode since the early 1980s.
But not all low-inflation episodes are equal. Figure 2
shows the evolution of the volatility of inflation,
calculated as the standard deviation of annual infla-
tion over the preceding ten years. One can now see
more clearly than in Figure 1, that there have been
two episodes in which U.S. monetary policy has been
successful in stabilizing inflation. These standard
deviations are low in the 1960s as well as in the
1990s. Both episodes look remarkably similar in
that regard. Obviously, one needs to keep in mind
that these standard deviations are “backward look-
ing,” i.e., a low standard deviation plotted for a partic-
ular year really means that inflation has been stable
in the preceding ten years up to and including the
year in question. 
It is interesting to compare the inflation volatility
with the corresponding volatility in real output
growth (see Figures 3 and 4). While the literature
occasionally emphasizes a trade-off between these
volatilities (see, e.g., Uhlig, 2001), these figures show
substantial comovement between both volatilities
for the United States. These figures seem to suggest
that an environment of low and stable inflation
helps to reduce output volatility and support econ-
omic activity. 
From that perspective, both the 1950s and
1960s as well as the 1980s and 1990s have been
particularly successful episodes of U.S. monetary
policy (or may have been episodes in which mone-
tary policy was “lucky” due to the absence of major
disruptions such as oil price shocks). These success-
























































ful episodes were achieved without an explicit
inflation-targeting regime. I doubt that introducing
an explicit inflation-targeting regime could have
produced better monetary policy during these epi-
sodes. The post-1994 comparison by LNP focuses
on an episode in U.S. monetary policy that already
was very successful: It is therefore not surprising
that one has a hard time interpreting the evidence
presented by LNP as making a strong enough case
for the introduction of inflation targeting in the
United States.
What is much more crucial, though, is the
question of how one can avoid an episode like the
1970s (or, even more dramatically, an episode like
the one before 1950), in which inflation volatility
and output volatility were both high. Can we really
be confident that political forces will continue to
appoint central bankers to the FOMC who under-
stand the benefits of low and stable inflation, who
understand the importance of sticking to rules rather
than using discretion, and who continue to put these
principles into practice? As an “insurance,” wouldn’t
it be wonderful to somehow enshrine some of these
principles underlying the currently successful U.S.
monetary policy for the future? Here is where the
real issue lies. And here is where inflation targeting
can help. Once an explicit inflation target has been
announced and once the Fed explains its policy
choices in terms of this target, a repeat of the 1970s
or a repeat of the episode prior to the 1950s still
cannot be ruled out. But it will be more difficult,
since it would require a more clearly visible devia-
tion from principles established before. These are
sunshine days for U.S. monetary policy, and there
is wide agreement among monetary policymakers
as well as academics as to the key goals of monetary
policies and the principles underlying good conduct.
Enshrining them now supports a longer life for this
type of monetary policy.
AN ESTIMATION BIAS
A key claim in the LNP paper is that inflation
forecasts are more highly correlated with past infla-
tion in non-targeting countries than in inflation-
targeting countries. The authors have also
documented, however, that inflation is more
volatile—in particular—at high frequencies, in infla-
tion-targeting countries. This leads to a bias in their
coefficient estimate. 
Consider their regression equation (1),
(1) ,
where πtis the inflation rate, π ˆt
(q)is the q-period-ahead
forecast of inflation, and ∆ denotes the change in
the variable in question. Suppose that inflation is
the sum of some persistent process ζt—a random
walk, say—plus i.i.d. noise υt, 
.
Thus, ∆πt is a noisy signal about the change ∆ζt
πζυ ttt =+
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Scatter Plot of 10-Year Standard Deviations: 
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of the inflation trend. Given some other source of
signal about the trend change as well as some prior
view, the best forecast will be some weighted average
of the recent change in inflation as well as the other
source of information and the prior, with the weights
proportional to the precision of the signal. Put differ-
ently, the larger the variance of the noise υt, the lower
the weight of ∆πt in the inflation forecast and thus
the lower the coefficient β. Econometrically, the
regressor ∆πtis a noisy version of the “true” regressor
∆ζt, leading to a downward bias in β, which is the
larger the larger is the variance in υt (i.e., the larger
is the high-frequency volatility in inflation). Since
the authors find higher high-frequency volatility in
inflation for inflation targeters, it is therefore not
surprising that the correlation of inflation forecasts
with current inflation is lower than for non-targeting
central banks. 
Obviously, the other explanation for the lower
correlation is that the variance of the trend changes,
∆ζt, is lower or even zero for inflation targeters, as
they are fixing the desired level of inflation, whereas
it may be trending for non-targeters. This could and
should all be sorted out in a fully specified model,
including a signal-extraction-type equation for gen-
erating the forecast. The figures given in the paper
are suggestive that, indeed, desired inflation is sub-
ject to larger changes in the non-targeting countries,
as the authors suggest. As argued above, this does
not imply that inflation targeters have been more
successful with respect to the variables we care
about, namely, low and stable inflation. This econ-
omic issue is thus probably of greater relevance
than the econometric issue of the estimation bias.
Still, the bias deserves more attention and estima-
tion of a more appropriate model.
CONCLUSIONS
This paper is interesting, creative, and informa-
tive. It deepens our knowledge about the differences
between countries that have adopted inflation tar-
geting and those that have not. I do not believe that
the paper can empirically support the conclusion
that adopting an inflation target leads to more suc-
cessful monetary policy; nor does it allow the oppo-
site conclusion. More research is needed to get at
the issue of causation: This research seems feasible
to do and should be done.
What, then, is one to conclude? Should central
banks, specifically, the Federal Reserve or the
European Central Bank (ECB), adopt some version
of inflation targeting? It seems to me that the case
really rests in the power of the logic of the argu-
ment, not in the empirics presented by LNP. Both
the Federal Reserve and the ECB keep on emphasiz-
ing that keeping inflation low and stable is the best
contribution they can make to promote economic
activity. Furthermore, both central banks try to
minimize the distortions on financial markets
caused by monetary policy: They do so by commu-
nicating changes in monetary policy stances in
advance and by avoiding to “turn the wheels” too
fast. Keeping long-run inflation expectations stable
and reasonably low (but perhaps not too low) is of
great importance to both these central banks. Thus,
setting a clear goal for medium- and long-term
inflation and discussing the policy choices also,
although presumably not exclusively, in terms of
how quickly and in which way they will achieve
these goals can only help the Fed and the ECB to
pursue their desired policies yet more effectively.
Inflation targeting for these central banks would not
change their policies as they are currently pursued,
but rather would modify their existing communica-
tions. Inflation targeting will neither lead to dramatic
changes nor will it end the search for better mone-
tary policy. Inflation targeting will not preclude the
discussion of other policy objectives for monetary
policy: Instead, it allows for a compartmentalization
and structuring of the arguments. Furthermore, it
may help to enshrine the current wisdom that low
and stable inflation is a key goal for monetary policy,
thus helping to avoid another return to inflationary
episodes like the 1970s and the corresponding dis-
tortions to economic activity. In sum, inflation target-
ing is an addition to current communications and
discussions about monetary policy and offers a
gradual improvement by helping to further organize
the internal as well as public debate on monetary
policy choices and by helping to commit both the
public and the central banks to keeping inflation
low and stable. Viewed this way, inflation targeting
is a good idea and should be adopted both by the
Fed and the ECB.
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